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I. INTRODUCTION
T he United States Supreme Court has recently reevaluated its concept
of standing for claims involving violations of the fourth amendment.
The apparent purpose for reevaluation of this fundamental constitutional
principle was the Court's desire to respond to the debate currently raging
over the scope of the exclusionary rule. Whether one perceives the fourth
amendment as second to none in importance in the Bill of Rights or views
it as a nuisance is not the issue here. Rather, the issue is whether, in its
effort to limit the exclusionary rule, the Court has stripped the people of
the United States of the protections guaranteed by the fourth amendment
which the Court has historically recognized. A close inspection of the
Court's recent decisions concerning fourth amendment standing reveals
that the Court's desire for reform has resulted in a failure to follow
precedent. The Court has taken the logic and reasoning from prior cases
and liberally construed them to reach different results.
Rights under our Constitution and remedies to vindicate violations of
those rights are personal. Thus, individuals, in general, do not have the
right to complain in the courts about violations of the legal rights of
others or to invoke remedies for vindication of those rights.1 The right of
an individual to raise issues concerning a violation of his or her own
rights in a court and to benefit from a remedy designed to vindicate such
a violation is termed "standing."
* Associate Professor of Law and Criminal Justice, Northeastern University. J.D.,
George Washington University; LL.M., Harvard University.
W ong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (rights cannot be vicariously
asserted). Cf. United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The issue in this
novel case was whether a non-party at a criminal trial can assert a privacy interest to
restrict public access to papers seized from a non-party. The Court held that the non-party
(Church of Scientology) had significant privacy and property interests in the papers, and
that the trial court was the only forum that could grant relief.
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When the government violates the Constitution (or other law) it is not
always clear whether it has violated the rights of A or of B or of both. For
example, where governmental authorities obtain evidence against both
defendant A and defendant B through an illegal search of A's car, has the
government violated the Constitutional rights of A or of B or of both?
Should the government benefit from its wrongdoing in B's prosecution,
when it could not profit from its actions in A's prosecution? Answers to
these questions go beyond mere evidentiary rulings to the heart of the
issue of standing.
Narrow construction of the scope of an individual's rights promotes the
government's ability to violate the Constitution and impedes the citi-
zenry's ability to curtail such violations through the courts. Governmen-
tal violations of the laws, especially the fundamental laws, are serious
threats to the preservation of freedom in a democratic society. Any court
decision that allows the government to violate the Constitution with de
facto impunity is inconsistent with the political philosophy of our
government. 2 The Court's recent "standing" cases reflect this inconsis-
tency.
The following is an examination of recent Supreme Court cases on
fourth amendment standing. In order to set the precedential stage, this
Article initially explores the meaning of the fourth amendment as
expressed by predecessors of the current Court. Recent Supreme Court
and circuit court cases are also cited to demonstrate the implications of
the limited scope now afforded to standing.
2 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 485 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). Brandeis writes:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued to civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
fourth amendment.
Id, He concludes:
In a government of laws, [the] existence of the government will be imperilled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies
the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure
the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 485.
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II. THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In the words of Justice Frankfurter in Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe,3 "[t]he ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitu-
tion itself and not what we have said about it."4 Similarly, in Weems v.
United States,5 Justice McKenna wrote that the language of the Consti-
tution stands for principles of wide application lest "rights declared in
words might be lost in reality."6
Thus, whatever one's view as to the proper role of the Court in
constitutional interpretation, argument should not be necessary to illus-
trate that if the Constitution is to be enforced, the enforcers must look to
the document itself to determine what is to be enforced. If the principles
of the Constitution are to have vitality over an extended period of time,
then the Constitution "must be capable of wider application than the
[specific] mischiefls] which gave it birth."7
The text of the fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.8
Surely there are many different interpretations which follow from a
reading of this passage. What may be reasonable to those who favor a
limited application of the fourth amendment will be different from that
which is reasonable to those who support the basic thrust of the
amendment. In the words of Justice Frankfurter: "A decision [of a fourth
amendment claim] may turn on whether one gives that amendment a
place second to none in the Bill of Rights, or considers it on the whole a
kind of nuisance, a serious impediment in the war against crime." 9
In spite of this problem, the words of the amendment acknowledge "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects" and command that this right shall not be violated by unreason-
able searches and seizures. It is not necessary in this Article to determine
the parameters of "the right of the people to be secure." Indeed, if one
adopts the basic principles of our Declaration of Independence, these
3 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (concurring opinion).
Id. at 491-92.
5 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
6 Id. at 373.
7 Id.
s U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
1988]
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parameters will be constantly expanding as technology improves our
ability to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
When determining the meaning of the fourth amendment, one is not
stranded on the island of plain meaning and common sense. The plain
meaning of the amendment and common sense are merely the starting
point. One would be misguided to ignore the wisdom of past Supreme
Court decisions on the construction to be given the fourth amendment,
the Bill of Rights generally, and the function of the Court in our
constitutional framework.
In a 1961 decision, Mapp v. Ohio,10 Justice Clark summoned the
wisdom of an earlier Court. Justice Clark stated that seventy-five years
earlier, in Boyd v. United States, the Court held that the doctrines of the
fourth and fifth amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
privacies of life."" As Justice Clark pointed out, the Boyd Court stated
that "constitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed.' 2 Less than thirty years after Boyd, the
Court, in Weeks v. United States," concluded that the fourth amendment
limits and restrains the power and authority of the United States and
federal officials.' 4 Specifically dealing with the use of unconstitutionally
seized evidence, the Court in Weeks argued that "the efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment . . .are not aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of en-
deavor. .... 15
In another fourth amendment case, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,16
Justice Stewart stated that the "protections of the [f]ourth [a]mendment
are of a wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with
promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial," but rather
reflect the concern of our society to be let alone. 7 Finally, in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire,"8 Justice Stewart again recalled Mr. Justice Bradley's
admonition in Boyd v. United States that "a close and literal construction
deprives them [the amendments] of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than
substance."19
'0 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'" Id. at 646.
12 Id. at 647.
13 232 U.S. 382 (1914).
14 Id. at 391.
'5 Id. at 393.
16 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
17 Id. at 242.
'8 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
'9 Id. at 453-54.
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III. THE RAKAS, SALVUCCI AND RAWLINGS DECISIONS
Against this background, a striking contrast is provided in Rakas v.
Illinois,20 United States v. Salvucci,21 and Rawlings v. Kentucky.22 This
trilogy demonstrates the Court's desire to restrict the use of the exclu-
sionary rule by narrowing fourth amendment standing. The Court, in the
process of accomplishing its desired result, sacrificed precedent and logic.
Such a sacrifice was apparent to the dissent in Rakas: "In the rush to
limit the applicability of the exclusionary rule somewhere, anywhere, the
Court ignores precedent, logic, and common sense to exclude the rule's
operation from situations in which, paradoxically, it is justified and
needed."23
In Rakas, petitioners were on trial for armed robbery. Citing a lack of
standing, the trial court denied petitioners' objections to the admission
into evidence of a sawed-off shotgun and shells. The evidence had been
seized by police during a search of the locked glove compartment and the
area beneath the front passenger seat of the automobile in which
petitioners had been passengers. Prior to the search, petitioners were
ordered out of the car by police. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's denial of standing.
The Court first rejected the past terminology of "standing":
For we are not at all sure that the determination of a motion to
suppress is materially aided by labeling the inquiry identified in
Jones as one of standing, rather than recognizing it as one
involving the substantive questions of whether or not one of the
proponents of the motion to suppress has had his own fourth
amendment rights infringed by the search and seizure which he
seeks to challenge. 24
Throughout the opinion, the Court maintained that constitutional rights
are personal and may not be vicariously asserted. However, the mere
20 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (5-4 decision) (Individual claiming a fourth amendment violation
must show the violation was of his own privacy expectations in the place searched or the
objects seized).
2' 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (overruling Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), automatic
standing in possessory offenses now a possessory interest subordinate to legitimate
expectation of privacy).
22 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (property interests are subordinate to privacy expectations in
determining standing to challenge fourth amendment violations).
23 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 169 (dissenting opinion).
24 Id. at 133. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the Court held
that a defendant could establish standing by demonstrating ownership or possession of the
seized property, legitimate presence on the premises at the time of the search, or a
proprietary or possessory interest in the premises searched. Jones also held that automatic
standing was granted to a defendant charged with a possessory crime.
19881
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recitation of this principle of law does not materially aid the inquiry into
the fundamental issue of whether the petitioners' rights were violated.
Therefore, as the Court recognized, the fundamental inquiry "in turn
requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has
infringed an interest of the defendant which the [f]ourth [a]mendment
was designed to protect."25 Furthermore, if the vitality of the fourth
amendment and precedents are to control, "[t]he ultimate question, is
whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusions is reasonable
in light of all surrounding circumstances. ' ' 26
Rakas shifts the inquiry to the defendant's "legitimate expectations of
privacy" in the area searched. The reasonableness standard requires case
by case determinations. However, certain criteria that may be relied
upon by the courts in determining which expectations of privacy are
reasonable, emerges from a close analysis of Rakas and preceeding cases.
Some of these criteria are: (1) legitimate presence on the premises
searched; 27 (2) "automatic" standing where possession of the items seized
is an element of the offense charged; 28 (3) the target theory-one against
whom the search was directed;29 (4) interest in either the place searched
or the property seized;30 and (5) whether the party took precautions to
maintain his privacy:
[T]he Court has examined whether a person invoking the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment took normal precautions to main-
tain his privacy-that is, precautions customarily taken by those
seeking privacy.... Similarly, the Court has looked to the way a
person has used a location to determine whether the [flourth
[a]mendment should protect his expectation of privacy.... The
Court on occasion also has looked to history to discern whether
certain types of government intrusion were perceived to be
objectionable by the Framers of the [flourth [almendment ....
And, as the Court states today, property rights reflect society's
explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in
certain areas, and, therefore, should be considered in determining
25 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
26 Id. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring).
27 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
28 Id. at 264. The automatic standing rule was developed by the Court to relieve the
defendant of the dilemma that in order to assert a challenge to a search or seizure, the
defendant had to establish standing by admitting to an essential element of the alleged
possessory offense.
29 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (those against whom a search is
directed should be included as among those who may object). Compare Rakas, 439 U.S. 128
at 134 (where the Court refuses to sustain petitioner's "target theory") with United States
v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.) (corporate officer as defendant has standing because
seizure was directed at him as well as at corporation), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978).
3o Jones, 362 U.S. at 266, 261.
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whether an individual's expectations of privacy are reason-
able.31
Rakas does not involve the "automatic standing" doctrine. The complex-
ities of the "target" theory of standing and the Court's rejection of this
theory are not fully discussed in this Article. For the present, attention is
focused on criteria 1, 4 and 5 above. Number 2 will be addressed in the
later discussion of United States v. Salvucci.
3 2
In Rakas, it was undisputed that the petitioners were passengers in the
subject automobile with permission of the owner-driver and, therefore,
were legitimately present in the place searched. The fact that they were
ordered out of the car against their will by the police cannot possibly have
any effect on the legitimacy of their presence. It is axiomatic that
legitimate presence means legitimate "use of" the space occupied includ-
ing the immediately surrounding area. The extent to which legitimacy
can be conferred is, to a great extent, determined by the individual who
originally granted permission to be present. Is it then an unreasonable
expectation of privacy to expect to be secure from unreasonable govern-
ment searches in a private area where one has a right to be? It is
important to note that this does not mean that the government cannot
search the area; it simply means that the government must first meet the
fourth amendment requirements of reasonableness for the search.
It follows that if an individual has the right to use an area in which she
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, that individual also has a right
to be secure from unreasonable government searches in his or her use of
the area. The fact that unlawful acts may be accomplished in privacy is
irrelevant to any determination of whether the expectation of the privacy
is reasonable. Obviously a person cannot reasonably expect fourth
amendment protection where there is no privacy. The proper inquiry has
to be "whether a person invoking the protection of the [flourth [a]mend-
ment took normal precautions customarily taken by those seeking
privacy." 33 This is precisely what the petitioners in Rakas did. Placing
" Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
32 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
" Id. This emphasis on "normal precautions customarily taken by those seeking
privacy" has required the courts to spend a great deal of time deciding what is "normal":
Compare United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant has a protected
privacy interest in records secreted into parents' home and placed under parents' bed), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982), with Lee v. Gilstrap, 661 F.2d 999 (4th Cir. 1981) (defendant
has no standing to challenge search of house he occupied but which was owned by
mother-in-law), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 907 (1982). For consideration of various containers
see: United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1981) (no expectation of privacy in
paper bag found in plain view on back seat of car); United States v. Sutton, 636 F.2d 96 (5th
Cir. 1981) (no expectation of privacy in paper sack in plain view; however, expectation does
exist in locked briefcase in trunk); United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980)
(no expectation in triple-bagged items). Compare United States v. Cleary, 656 F.2d 1302
1988]
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shells in a locked glove compartment and a sawed-off shotgun under the
front passenger seat were the precautions taken by Rakas and his friend
in order to maintain their "privacy" in these items. As passengers in a car
driven by the owner, it cannot be doubted that the petitioners had
permission to be in the car; indeed, they were engaged in a joint
enterprise with the owner.
The Court's logic about the diminished expectation of privacy in an
automobile is disingenuous. While it is true that courts have held that
there is a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile, 34 such
holdings are relevant only to the issue of the reasonableness of a search.
They cannot be relevant to the determination of the applicability of the
fourth amendment unless the Court is now implying that the expectation
of privacy in an automobile is diminished to the point where it has no
fourth amendment significance. No court has held that there is no
(9th Cir. 1981) (legitimate expectation in canvas bag even with broken zipper), vacated, 457
U.S. 113 (1982), with United States v. Weber, 668 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1981) (legitimate
expectation in rolled-up rainslicker containing walkie-talkie), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105
(1982). In some decisions, the court's reasoning focuses on the place of hiding, not the
container. See United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1982) (legitimate
expectation in box which was sealed and taped but not in barn where it was hidden, thus
defendant had no right or interest of exclusive access); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982)(if police suspect that container in auto may conceal object of search, then warrantless
search of container is allowed pursuant to legitimate auto search). Open land presents some
ambiguities as well; see United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1981) (legitimate
expectation of privacy in home and yard enclosed by fence); U.S. v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 (5th
Cir. 1982) (legitimate expectation in ranch enclosed by fences). But cf. United States v.
Long, 674 F.2d 848 (11th Cir. 1982) (with no residence on land, no expectation of privacy in
yard around barn); United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1981) (millyard of
lumber company surrounded by barbed wire fence and no residence within, no expectation),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
31 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (warrantless search of car unjusti-
fied when car is parked, defendant arrested and no likelihood of car's removal; expectation
diminished by mobility of auto). Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (does not end the
ambiguity of car searches and fourth amendment claims). Compare United States v.
McCulley, 673 F.2d 346 (11th Cir. 1982) (defendants had no standing as to search of auto
rented by co-defendant when interest was only to share expenses) with United States v.
Posez, 663 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1981) (defendant had legitimate expectation in auto when under
his exclusive control with owner's permission), cert. denied 455 U.S. 959 (1982) and United
States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir.) (defendant had key, therefore had possible dominion
and control and a legitimate expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 955 (1979);
United States v. Ramapurian, 632 F.2d 1149 (4th Cir. 1980) (no expectation if car appears
to be abandoned in open field, even if defendant owned the car), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030
(1981). Compare McCulley, 673 F.2d 346 with United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336 (9th
Cir. 1982) (although not owners, defendant agreed formally to transport contraband in
truck driven by accomplice, defendants had legitimate expectation of privacy because they
kept truck under surveillance from another vehicle or rode in the truck).
[Vol. 36:441
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legitimate expectation of privacy in an automobile; in fact, the cases hold
precisely the opposite.3 5
To limit the applicability of fourth amendment standing, the Court in
Rakas effectively had to overrule Jones on the issue of legitimate
presence. The Court held that "the phrase 'legitimately on premises,'
coined in Jones, creates too broad a gauge for measurement of fourth
amendment rights."36 But the Court interpreted the phrase "legitimately
on premises" to "permit a casual visitor who has never seen, or been
permitted to visit the basement of another's house to object to a search of
the basement if the visitor happened to be in the kitchen of the house at
the time of the search." 37
"Legitimately on premises" clearly means presence on premises to
which one has been given (legitimate) access. Using the Court's example,
when the ordinary person permits a casual visitor, who has never seen or
been permitted to visit his basement to be in his kitchen, he is not thereby
giving access to his basement. Contrary to the Court's position, a casual
visitor who walks into a house one minute before a search of the house
commences and leaves one minute after the search ends should be able to
contest the legality of the search if he had been given legitimate access to
the house."3 8
If the above means a search in areas of the house in which the casual
visitor was not legitimately present, then the visitor would not have
" See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971).
36 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
37 Id.
31 Id. The ambiguity of the Court's opinion on "legitimacy of presence" has fostered a
line of cases with results that could be labeled capricious and arbitrary. Compare United
States v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir. 1983) (overnight guest, not casual visitor, has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal belongings and bags left in home of host) with
United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (although a guest in house,
defendant fails to establish privacy expectation when no indication of length of stay or
relationship to host is given; no privacy expectation when guest in home which housed
seven or eight other guests). Compare United States v. Ladd, 704 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1983)
(no expectation of privacy in contraband put in house without knowledge or consent of
owner) with United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant has privacy
interest in records secreted in parents' home and placed under parents' bed), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1022 (1982) and Lees v. Gilstrap, 661 F.2d 999 (4th Cir. 1981) (no expectation of
privacy in house occupied by defendant but owned by mother-in-law), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
907 (1982). It has also been held that guests of a registered hotel guest have no legitimacy
of presence. See United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982) (hotel room registered
to co-defendant in which defendant is merely present fails to establish privacy interest); Ray
v. United States Dept. of Justice, 658 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff lacked privacy
interest in third party hotel room; no expectation of privacy in letters sent by plaintiff and
delivered to hotel room of third party); United States v. Vargas, 633 F.2d 891 (1st Cir. 1980)
(defendant possesses no privacy interest in room registered to another); United States v.
Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding same).
1988]
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available to him or her "legitimate presence" as a basis to contest the
legality of the search. If it means a search of areas where the casual
visitor was present legitimately, then the fourth amendment should be
available. The issue needs to be stated forthrightly. The vitality of the
fourth amendment is jeopardized when case law says an individual has no
right to be secure from unreasonable government searches and seizures if
he is legitimately present in another's private home for the first time.
In his Rakas dissent, Justice White criticized the majority's eviscera-
tion of a long line of cases holding that the fourth amendment's bar
against unreasonable searches is not limited to protection of property
rights. White argued that the same logic that led the Court to conclude
that "an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, in a
taxicab, or in a telephone booth" may be protected by the fourth
amendment also leads to the conclusion that "a person riding in an
automobile next to his friend, the owner, must have some protection
as well."39
The rewriting of the fourth amendment standing doctrine only began
with Rakas. In 1980, the Court completed the task in United States v.
Salvucci 4° and Rawlings v. Kentucky.41 Based on the rationale of Rakas,
the Court dismantled the criteria of automatic standing in Salvucci and
possessory interest in Rawlings.
In Salvucci, the defendants were charged with unlawful possession of
stolen mail. The checks that formed the basis of the crime had been seized
by police during a search of an apartment rented by one defendant's
mother conducted pursuant to a warrant. Defendants moved to suppress
the evidence on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the application
for the search warrant was inadequate to show probable cause. After the
" Rakas, 439 U.S. at 162-65 (White, J., dissenting). The Rakas reasonable expectation
of privacy test has had effect on the Court's opinions concerning an individual privacy
expectation when the property is related to a corporation or business, especially one highly
regulated by the government. See United States v. Acklen, 690 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1982)
(because pharmaceutical industry is highly regulated, pharmacist had a lesser expectation
of privacy in prescription files); United States v. Katz, 705 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1983) (bank
customer possesses no expectation of privacy in bank's Currency Transaction Reports); and
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (no privacy interest in defendant's accounts
illegally seized from bank official). Compare United States v. Allison, 619 F.2d 1254 (8th
Cir. 1980) (union official possesses legitimate privacy expectation in records held in union
office) with United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1981) (because millyard could
be inspected at any time, a reasonable expectation of privacy could not be asserted), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 439 (1982) and United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(corporations possess many public attributes reducing their expectation of privacy) and
United States v. Blue Diamond Coal, 667 F.2d 510 (6th Cir. 1981) (statute allows inspection
of company books by regulatory agencies and "interested persons," therefore operators of
mine had no reasonable expectation of privacy in books), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982).
40 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
41 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
[Vol. 36:441
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district court granted the motion, the court of appeals affirmed, holding
that since respondents were charged with crimes of possession, they were
entitled to claim "automatic standing" as enunciated in Jones. The
Supreme Court, however, decided that the time was ripe to overrule the
automatic standing of Jones. Justice Rehnquist stated, in effect, that one
who petitions to exclude illegally obtained evidence must show that his
rights were violated. He could no longer rely on Jones, as Jones had
"outlived its usefulness and served "only to afford a windfall to defen-
dants whose fourth amendment rights had not been violated."42 The court
asserted that the "legal contradiction" in Rakas was that a prosecutor
may simultaneously maintain that a criminal possessed the seized good,
but that he was not subject to fourth amendment deprivation.43 In
addition, the court cited Simmons v. U.S.44 and its holding that testimony
given by the defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be
admitted as evidence of guilt at trial, as providing the impetus to overrule
Jones.45
After refocusing the inquiry in standing cases by declaring that none of
the criteria of the past cases are to be controlling in the future, and by
overruling the automatic standing of Jones, the Salvucci Court used the
concept of "interest in the property seized" as a criterion for fourth
amendment standing.
The court used the reasoning of Salvucci to deny standing to the
petitioner in Rawlings. In Rawlings, six police officers armed with a
warrant to arrest Lawrence Marquess arrived at Marquess' house. In the
house at the time was one of Marquess' housemates, Dennis Sadler, and
four visitors, Keith Northern, Linda Braden, Vanessa Cox and petitioner
David Rawlings. While searching the house unsuccessfully for Marquess,
several officers smelled marijuana smoke and saw marijuana seeds. Two
of the officers left to obtain a search warrant. The other officers detained
the occupants, allowing them to leave only if they consented to a body
search. Northern and Braden did consent to such a search and were
allowed to leave.
Approximately fourty-five minutes later, the officers returned with the
search warrant, which was read to the remaining occupants along with
the "Miranda" warnings. Cox, who was seated on a couch next to
4' Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 95.
43 Id. at 88.
44 390 U.S. 370 (1968).
" Justice Marshall, however, raised issues in his dissent which questioned whether
Simmons provided protection against self-incrimination since the majority left open the
question of whether the testimony could be used for impeachment purposes. Justice
Marshall also stated that the opportunity for the prosection to use information garnered at
a suppression hearing during cross-examination should not be at the price of asserting a
fourth amendment claim. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 96-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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petitioner, was ordered to empty her purse, which was between her and
petitioner. The contents of the purse included drugs which were con-
trolled substances under Kentucky law. Upon pouring out the contents of
her purse, Cox turned to petitioner and told him "to take what was his"
and Rawlings immediately claimed ownership of the controlled sub-
stances. At that time an officer searched petitioner, found a knife and
$4,500 in cash, and formally arrested him.
Rawlings had placed the drugs in Cox's purse on the morning of his
arrest. Although there is dispute over the discussion that took place,
petitioner testified that he "asked [Cox] if she would carry this for [him],
and she said 'yes."' Petitioner then left the room to use the bathroom, and
when he returned he discovered that the police had arrived to arrest
Marquess.
The State conceded that the search of Cox's purse was unreasonable
and in violation of the fourth amendment. On these facts, and in light of
Salvucci, the questions presented on the issue of standing were (1)
whether petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
searched-Cox's purse-and, (2) whether petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the items seized because of his ownership of
these items.
In answering both these questions in the negative, the Court reasoned
that Rawlings had neither previously sought access to the purse, nor had
any right to exclude others from access, nor did he take normal precau-
tions to maintain his privacy. Justice Rehnquist also cites Rakas as
"emphatically rejecting the notion that 'arcane' concepts of property law
ought to control the ability to claim the protection of the [f]ourth
[a]mendment." 46
The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, in which Justice Brennan
joined, provides some comfort, for it illustrated that not all the Justices of
the Court were intent on contributing to the illogic and inconsistency of
the majority's opinion.
Justice Marshall contended that the Rawlings majority rejected the
fundamental principle that an interest in either place or property
invoked the Constitution's protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures. He claimed that the Court substantially cut back the
protections that had been expanded by earlier decisions such as Jones and
46 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980). See United States v. Medina-
Verdugo, 637 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 (5th
Cir. 1982) (no legitimate expectation of privacy with neither a proprietary nor possessory
interest demonstrated); United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1983) (no
possessory interest is dispositive of expectation of privacy); United States v. Merlo, 704 F.2d
331 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding same); United States v. Johnston, 685 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1982)
(no standing to challenge search of car when defendant admitted he never possessed car).
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Katz v. United States.47 According to Justice Marshall, "an ungrudging
application of the [fjourth [a]mendment is indispensable to preserving
the liberties of a democratic society. ' ' 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The holdings ofRakas, Salvucci, and Rawlings demonstrate the Court's
desire to limit the applicability of the exclusionary rule. These cases also
demonstrate that the Court was impatient. The Court was not willing to
allow other judicial and/or legislative efforts to address the issue of
alternatives to the rule, alternatives brought about by means less
destructive to fundamental rights founded in the fourth amendment.
Even if one is convinced that the exclusionary rule is in need of reform,
one can assuredly agree that there was a method of bringing about such
reform which was less obtrusive than the evisceration of the fourth
amendment of the Rehnquist Court.
The Court's approach brings to mind a story of a big two-hundred-year
old cabin in the mountains of New Hampshire overlooking a lake. While
a group of campers were using the log cabin, mosquitos got in and became
a substantial nuisance. One group of campers proposed the distasteful
and not totally effective approach of spraying the cabin with insecticide.
The other group was outraged at this suggestion, stating that this
approach merely coddles the mosquitos and many may escape the effects
of the spray. This group insisted that tough, drastic action was required
to eliminate these pests, that they had a right to quiet enjoyment of the
cabin, and that the pests had no right whatsoever to be in the cabin. It
would be necessary to burn the cabin. This, they proclaimed, would give
them peace of mind knowing that the pests were eliminated. The other
group, in an effort to recover from the shock of what they had just heard,
consoled themselves with the thought that there may be some validity to
the proposal and maybe they should have more deference for the wisdom
of the second group and allow them to try the tough, drastic approach.
It seems that the way to save the cabin is to protect it so that the flames
will never spread into a conflagration, resulting in total destruction of
fourth amendment safeguards. Since the present Court cannot be relied
upon to choose a more limited approach that preserves these provisions,
Congress will need to act. In the spirit of the precedent articulated in
Jones, Congress should enact legislation granting fourth amendment
standing in the following situations: (1) where possession of the items
seized is an element of the offense charged; (2) when a search is conducted
in the immediate private or semiprivate area where a petitioner is
47 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 114-21.
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lawfully present; (3) when the petitioner has an interest in the place
searched or property seized; and (4) in all situations where a person
invoking the protection of the fourth amendment took precautions
customarily taken by those seeking privacy. Such legislation is a first
step toward the revitalization of our precious commitment to the princi-
ple that the people have a right to be secure from unreasonable govern-
mental searches and seizures.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol36/iss3/7
